

# Independence and Peace for the Vietnamese People!

## YANKEE GO HOME!

# VIETNAM COURIER

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No 122

4th Year

■ ■ ■ THREE YEARS AFTER THE FIRST U.S. AIR RAID ON THE D.R.V.N.

## RUNGS OF A CRIMINAL ESCALATION, LANDMARKS OF A MAJOR FAILURE OF U.S. STRATEGY

IT was when President Johnson exclaimed which way is good to carry out the bombing in North Viet Nam that in a prison camp of the D.R.V.N., captured U.S. pilots circulated a handbill called "New Runway". This is not an usual runway or an usual aircraft carrier from which daily on criminal missions over North Viet Nam. It is a runway

with an arrow pointing to the direction of the U.S.A. symbol of their dream of being able to come home one day to lead a honest life, after having clearly realized that the old runways only bring indeterminable gloom to the Sino-Vietnamites. It is hardly three years at the longest since the capture of the first U.S. pilot, Lieutenant Alvarez, on August 5, 1964, when U.S. rulers unjustifiably launched air strikes on the D.R.V.N. This is a short period in a White House plan directed under three presidents against an independent and sovereign state.


FROM THE TRUDEAU  
PLAN TO THE STALEY-  
TAYLOR PLAN

THERE have been many changes in the U.S.A.'s position of "friendship" foreign policy. When the shelling from gunboats becomes ineffective, there is a recourse to the dollar power. As the financial might fails to prevent the downfall of colonialism, Washington naturally returns to classical methods: sabotage and subversion. In October 1964, Congress had approved the annual appropriations of over

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August 5,  
1964

### The First U.S. Plane Downed in North Viet Nam



Since then 2,144 Others Have  
Met the Same Fate

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### NORTH VIETNAM

\* Quang Binh Downed Its 300th U.S. Plane on July 30.

\* Rural Militiamen of Le Thuy (Quang Binh) downed 2 Jets with Light Weapons on July 30.

\* 2,145 U.S. Aircraft Downed in 3 years.

### SOUTH VIETNAM

\* From July 26 to 28, 5 U.S. Bases Pounded by the L.A.F.

\* Saigon Periphery unceasingly Harassed by Guerrillas.

RISING OF AFRO-AMERICANS  
IN THE U.S.A.

## OUR BROTHERS in America

AFTER Viet Nam, come Detroit Newark, Buffalo, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Washington : the craze of gun

resounds in American cities, shaken by the sounds of tanks. Men die whose only crime is to be born with a black skin.

There is a so-called Negro problem in the United States. For Viet Nam is much more than a Negro problem, an abstract "problem" among the thousands that beset our times. A Negro who falls in the United States under the bullets of policemen and racists, makes us seethe with anger, and tears come to our eyes. The murder of Negro children tears our hearts. The sounds of guns in Detroit, and the rumble of tanks in the Black Ghettos of America echo deeply in our hearts.

That great anger which explodes those Negro quarters rising up in a heroic struggle, those men, women, children standing up to Yankee soldiers armed with bottles, bricks, shotguns, infuses emotion and enthusiasm into our hearts. When American Negroes rise up to defend

their freedom, they also defend our freedom, and the freedom of all in this world.

The heroic fight of the Negroes. It is the same as also our brothers, the Negroes, McNameas, Evans Kuakas, the big Yankees trusts, the generals and politicians in service of big companies, who are marching for the war in Viet Nam and for repression against the Black Ghettos. It is the same men, Johnsons, McNamara, Evans Kuakas, the big Yankees trusts, the generals and politicians in service of big companies, who are marching for the war in Viet Nam and for repression against the Black Ghettos.

It is the same members of the Ku Klux Klan, of the John Birch Society and others, Bell Connor and his accomplices, who are the worst "hawks" concerning Viet Nam. Those who exploit, those who lynch Negroes in the United States are the same who want to reduce the Vietnamese people to serfdom, who have tried to pull them up in strategic ghettos, and quell them still for independence with napalm, phosphorus bombs and poison gas.

The American Negroes' heroic struggle, their cavalry charge, their fierce resistance, all successive stages of their fierce fight have gradually been engraved upon the

(Continued page 2)





## Vietnam People Support Afro-Americans' Just Struggle

THE Johnson Administration's barbarous suppression of the African-American movement of struggle against racial discrimination in many American cities and towns has aroused indignation among the world public opinion. The Vietnamese people who have been actively struggling against the U.S. imperialists, oppose the inhuman and unjust actions taken by the U.S. ruling clique against the Afro-Americans and express their warm support to the African-American struggle against suppression and racial discrimination.

A meeting was held at the Hotel Hanoi to which heartily support the struggle of the Afro-Americans against this racial discrimination.

On this occasion, the Presi-

Dent Fatherland Front, the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation Central Committee, and the Lawyers' Association, have issued statements supporting the struggle of the Afro-Americans.

The July 27, 1967 statement of the Presidents of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front and the Viet Nam National F.N.L.F. fully support the just struggle of the American people against racial discrimination in the U.S.A., and that for freedom and civil rights of the Afro-Americans. They regard it as a just struggle of the people to defend. This constitutes a struggle for national liberation and at the same time the most savagely exploited and oppressed by the U.S. monopoly capitalism. It has given its all to the struggle for national salvation in particular".

## Viet Nam Peace Delegation Sends Report to Anti-A and H Bombs World Conference

(Continued from page 5)

The report praises the active role of the Japanese peace and progressive and democratic forces of Japan on the world people's front in exposing the U.S. imperialists' aggression. It recalled many fine gestures of the Japanese people and consider it a precious encouragement to their fight.

"The Vietnamese people

thoroughly support the struggle of the Japanese people for the return of Okinawa and Okinawa. The dismantling of U.S. bases, the removal of U.S. troops, the abolition of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and of the illegal Japan-South Korea Joint Statement, are fully independent, really democratic, and neutral Japan."

Foreign visitors have been particularly impressed by the fact that the Vietnamese people's struggle has been planned in terms of years and decades. The struggle of this country is turned to the future. Beyond war problems, they think just now

make admirable progress, prepare for brighter to-morrow and show an admirable sense of internationalism by establishing and consolidating the rule of justice and peace among people and men".

M. Cini (44) held the same

view: "It is this will, this courage, this calm determination to struggle against aggression while going to the death, this spirit of liberating man from slavery, poverty, at meeting his material needs and also at meeting his spiritual needs, which I consider to be the most remarkable part to be taken in collective life, it is just this determination of our party, nation and army — had an unshakable confidence in victory."

L. Rodriguez (44) was quite explicit about the matter: "I have seen and heard things quite difficult to imagine, even in hell, bombing, local authorities and cadres discussed reconstruction plan."

G. Halim (44) also remarked in this way: "In this country is double: to check U.S. aggression while preparing for peace by developing industry and imagination and my feelings".

Coming to a country victim of an aggression by his own country, Hugh Hayes was won over to anti-imperialist indignation, horror, astonishment, admiration. He wrote: "why the U.S. bombs us, phosphorous napalm and toxic chemicals continued working, struggled to find the answer: "It is for such independence and freedom as was defended by the Americans. And so he has hit the nail on the head.

Independence and freedom

are the goals of the struggle of the Vietnamese people. For them, — as President Ho Chi Minh has put it — we must always be ready to sacrifice in a struggle whose significance and hardship we are fully conscious of. Basso was right to assert: "The

Team, Press Conference of Jan 12, 1967.

(7) Lello Basso, Italian deputy, 3rd Investigation Team, Press Conference of Mar. 24, 1967.

(8) Dandam Khorlo, President of the Supreme Court of Mongolia, Press Conference of Mar. 24, 1967.

(9) George Fischer, lawyer (France), International Investigation Team, for Viet Nam, Press Conference of Mar. 24, 1967.

(10) Pei in Kel, General Secretary of the P.D.R. of Korea Lawyer's Association, International Investigation Team, Press Conference of Mar. 24, 1967.

(11) Dr. Francis Kahn, (France), 4th Investigation Team, Press Conference of Apr. 14, 1967.

(12) Leon Mataras, lawyer (France), First Investigation Team, Press Conference of Mar. 13, 1967.

(13) Tariq Ali Khan (Pakistan) and Investigation Team, Press Conference of Feb. 3, 1967.

(14) Gisèle Halimi, barrister and Investigation Team, Press Conference of Apr. 14, 1967.

(15) Marcello Cisl, physicist (Italy), 4th Investigation Team, Press Conference of Apr. 14, 1967.

(16) Dr. Jean Krivine (France), and Investigation Team, International Tribunal, Press Conference in Hanoi of Mar. 17, 1967.

(17) Monk Manas, lawyer (U.S.A.), 3rd Investigation Team, Press Conference of Mar. 24, 1967.

(18) John Gerassi, writer (U.S.A.), 1st Investigation Team, Press Conference of Mar. 24, 1967.

**TO THE READER**  
We are sorry that there is no room for improvement in the wording of our paper. We apologize to those shortcomings and hope you will accept our suggestions as they more efficiently in future.

PHAN QUANG

Vietnam Courier

## DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL ECONOMY...

(Continued from page 4)

The striking feature of which is to be found in the line of building and promoting regional economy.

First of all, it should be pointed out that this line did not appear merely with the U.S. war of destruction; it was the result of the socialist construction and the D.R.V.N. government.

The Party's Third Congress put forth, for the whole transition period to socialism, the task of making socialist industrialization with priority given to heavy industry which is the base of agriculture and light industry". In the initial phase of this transition period, North Viet Nam had to develop centrally-run modern enterprises with priority given to heavy industry, especially light industry, which were necessary and contributes to the formation of workers for the co-operative economy.

However, at its start, the building of modern industry does not easily develop agriculture. In turn, agriculture still handicapped by the consequences of war, by low labor productivity, bad crop and the scarcity of agricultural goods cannot satisfy the demand for industrial development. To such a situation, the policy of the Viet Nam Workers' Party and the D.R.V.N. government is to powerfully promote regional industry, covering the majority of production, and combined with small-scale and handicrafts.

The production of consumer goods, similar examples of orange-growing areas in North Viet Nam, are from 10 to 20 percent for the market. However, the local factory for the making of orange juice was in the D.R.V.N. capital city of Hanoi. The commodity had to be brought to the provinces for sale. And transportation cost greatly increased. The goods, of small industry, handicrafts and State enterprises, are transported by medium and chiefly small bases and working in the immediate future, in co-ordination with the centrally-run industry, regional industry concentrated on serving agriculture, the other branches of the economy.

This can be said to

regional eco-incluses rational agriculture and industry operating in close combination. At this stage, its task is to create an equilibrium between these two forms of production to free the former from being heavily dependent on natural conditions, and make both capable of supporting each other. Thus it has gradually to turn every province and city into an agricultural unit, organically linked to the country's socialist economy. In keeping with the above, the regional branches, the exchange of goods between them will be enlarged, the regional market strengthened, and regional trade brought into play for the furtherance of production.

Compared with, and assisted by, the centrally-run economy, regional economy has progressively assumed the role of the main factor in the struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression, stabilizing socio-economic relations. Simultaneously, it creates material and technical conditions necessary to the development of regional labour productivity, and pushed ahead the division of social labor throughout North Viet Nam.

With the afore-said orientation and object, the development of regional economy

## L.A.F. STRONG PRESSURE...

(Continued from page 8)

Hoa Phu, Vinh and Tan Uyen districts on the night of May 11 and 12, putting out action 800 G.I.'s and 200 puppet troops and 100 aircrafts. On the night of May 8, L.A.F. heavy guns pounded Tan Noc (Can Tho) bridge, destroying planes and set fire to the town.

It is obvious that after their great successes of the dry season, the position of the People's Armed Forces and the people in South Viet Nam has grown steeper and their forces stronger. In the last month, the American imperialists have made surprise attacks on the enemy defense systems. Among them, the most remarkable is the latest suffered bitter setbacks. The people's war has been stepped up on the basis of the slogan of "development and exten-<sup>sion</sup> of guerrilla warfare, the close co-operation of regular troops and guerrilla forces".

The L.A.F. have been waging large-scale operations and annihilations in the countryside. They have made much progress in annihilation actions, fighting tactics and wiping out the bases, capturing prisoners—including Americans—and weapons in many engagements. In certain areas, operations and in given areas, they combined large-scale aerial communication lines, in the enemy rear, they launched many large-scale operations and took advantage of the terrain to develop new effective tactics. This situation has opened up bright prospects for the L.A.F. in bringing them to mount bigger operations and wipe out at a time the enemy brigades or army corps.

On July 18, another puppet Ranger company was virtually wiped out in a place about 10 km west of Hon Quan (8) casualties.

## 5 U.S. BASES

(Continued from page 8)

skillfully combining small with big attacks, smashed the enemy raids on their localities.

One day, the guerrillas downed 7 U.S. planes and damaged 3 others. In another village, 53 Americans of the U.S. 1st Cavalry were killed or wounded by mine fields and spikes. In another locality the enemy was encircled from all directions by the guerrillas and had no killed.

Then in one week, 440 enemy soldiers, most of whom were captured, were wiped out by the guerrillas in Bac Ai, 19 planes downed and 27 others set on fire or damaged.

### THU BAU MOT

440 Enemy Troops Wiped Out in One Week and Regional Troops (June 23 to July 23).

N July 18, a puppet Ranger company infiltrated into an area between Highways 1 and 13, 10 km east of Hon Quan townlet and was knocked out by the guerrillas and regional army.

On July 18, another puppet Ranger company was virtually wiped out in a place about 10 km west of Hon Quan (8) casualties.

## U.S. POLICY OF USING STOOGES...

(Continued from page 3)

forces. Behind it stood the omnipotent "military force" corps set up by the U.S. aggressors.

The U.S. general staff, a patched-up administration and the command which was not only a concentration of aggression but also a concentration of the puppet regime. They had to work Ky off and Ba Gi (May 1965). Song Be

and Ba Gi (December 1964). Song Be

and Ba Gi (May 1965). The "special war" strategy was composed of using stooges.

The U.S. began pouring in expeditionary troops in an effort to cope with the situation in the South. The American troops of the puppet army and administration, which meant intensification and expansion of the war, pushed the most reactionary and bellicose elements among the U.S. aggressors to the take-over. Representatives of these were the "unruly young generals" headed by Thieu and Ky.

The coup d'etat of November 6, 1965 took place naturally in the context of the U.S. policy of improving its living standards, achieving socio-economic stability. Simultaneously, it created material and technical conditions necessary to the development of regional labour productivity, and pushed ahead the division of social labor throughout North Viet Nam.

With the afore-said orientation and object, the development of regional economy

shaky as ever. It has gone through at least five "rehearsals" which were nothing but a series of political and military crises: a great many of their opponents were first arrested or eliminated or dismissed, while a number of field officers in their posts were removed. Over the past ten years and more, the American imperialists have suffered repeated defeats in their policy of using stooges.

Their policy of using stooges in the Southern part of our country. Three changes of strategy have not extricated them from the difficulties they face. Further to exacerbate the internal antagonisms plaguing the ranks of the U.S. lackeys in South Viet Nam.

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★ **5 U.S. Bases—Lai Khe, Phu Loi, (Thu Dau Mot), Phuoc Vinh Air Base (Bien Hoa), Doc Mieu, Con Tien (Quang Tri) — Shelled on July 26 and 28.**

★ **Saigon Periphery Relentlessly Harassed by Guerrillas.**

#### THU DAU MOT

**O**N early morning of July 26, the L.A.F. simultaneously pounded U.S. military bases in Lai Khe and Phu Loi.

According to the encycy's report, the Lai Khe base of Regiment 18, U.S. Infantry Division 1, received 150 shells and Phu Loi base of U.S. Infantry Air Brigade, 2300 from Saigon, 200 shells.

#### BIEN HOA

**O**N the night of July 26 the Phuoc Vinh airfield of Brigade 1, U.S. Infantry Division 1, and military supplier headquarters in Tan Uyen some 75km to the South.

The enemy admitted that in Phu Loi, 54 G.I.'s were killed or wounded and a quantity of equipment in the airfield destroyed.

On July 27 the L.A.F. harassed at the same administrative quarter right in the center of Phan Rang town (Ninh Thuan province), wiping out 23 soldiers. In co-operation with the L.A.F., the general of Phan Rang destroyed the bridge leading to Thanh Son airfield, causing to the enemy the loss of thousands of litres of petrol.

#### QUANG TRI

**O**N the same day (July 27) the L.A.F. shelled Doc Mieu and Con Tien on the northwestern part of the plateau. According to GPX initial reports, these two places were set on fire right in the first salvos. Many G.I.'s were killed on the spot.

#### AROUND SAIGON

**O**N the night of July 25-26, the L.A.F. strategic Route 4 between Tan An town and Ben Luc township were cut off. A 20-long bridge on this road, 7km west of Ben Luc was blown up and all traffic from Saigon to My Tho and other provinces in Central Nam Bo was interrupted.

One post about 18km

northwest of Saigon was captured. The enemy admitted that one puppet platoon was decimated.

On the night of July 17 one platoon of puppet Division 23 was knocked out of action 30km northwest of Saigon.

On the night of July 18, a group of motorized vehicles forming the outer line around the Michelin rubber plantation, Cu Chi district, was attacked. 15 vehicles and all the troops onboard were knocked out.

On the night of July 7 an enemy vessel was destroyed in Binh Dinh base of (U.S. Infantry Division 9) about 75km southwest of Saigon.

On July 3 a landing craft was sunk, one U.S. platoon in Binh Tam district completely wiped out.

#### BA RIA

**4 Puppet Companies Put Out of Action and 2 Others Bodily Mauled.**

**A**CCORDING to GPX, on the night of July 19, the L.A.F. attacked the puppet companies protecting the pacification zones in a village of Chau Duc district, some 65km southeast of Saigon. They put out of action 3 puppet companies including regular puppet (Division 10) and 2 "civil guards" companies 613 and 614, downed 1 HU-16 helicopter, 1 C-47 transport plane and seized large quantities of arms and munitions and military equipment.

One week before, on July 11 and 12, the regional L.A.F. had wiped out 1 puppet Marine company, and decimated another (on the 11th) of the 5 puppet battalions comprising out raids with the U.S. and Australian troops on Hon Ray and Ben Ke).

#### NINH THUAN

**One Puppet Ranger Company Knocked Out and Another Virtually Wiped Out (July 12 and 18).**

**W**ITHIN a week between July 12 and 18, guerrillas of the villages of Bac Al districts

(Continued page 7)

**W**HEREAS the U.S. command had still been able to launch many corps-scale operations in the 1966-1967 dry season, they could only undertake small or middle-scale actions in May-June-July 1967 to cope with the situation and defend their bases and communication lines. On the contrary, the South Vietnamese big successes recorded in the dry season, the South Vietnamese army and people unrelentingly attacked the enemy on the front and in the rear, in mountain and in plain areas as well as in cities, driving them into a corner.

# L.A.F. STRONG PRESSURE IN THE LAST 3 MONTHS



In the defence line north of Quang Tri province, American forces were badly mauled by the L.A.F. although Westmoreland had sent 10 battalions of U.S. marines to Highway 9 and the Doc Mieu-Con Tien area and several hundred tanks and artillery attacks. Within 12 days, from April 24 to May 5, over 2,000 G.I.'s were killed or wounded.

On the night of May 3 and 4, three companies of puppet Rangers stationed in Vay Village were wiped out. In the first nine days of July there were 1,000 G.I.'s wiped out of action in the Gio An-Con Tien area, tens of thousands of litres of petrol (on the night of July 14), attacked and putting out of action a U.S. battalion and a U.S. company (on the night of July 3).

Because of these setbacks, General Walt was dismissed and replaced. He did not conceal his concern about the so-called shortage of equipment, of tactical theory, of flexible command, of troop strength (New York Times, July 17).

To prevent L.A.F. marches to the North, Westmoreland

despatched troops from key southern provinces to set up Oregon shock forces including Brigade 106, Brigade 3, Division 1 and Division 10, Brigade 107. The situation in the 1st Corps Area went from bad to worse. In Quang Ngai town for instance, in one month (May 21 to June 20), 3,950 Americans, satellites and 500 puppet troops were put out of action. A network of posts around Quang Ngai town were attacked in June, 300 pacification agents were wiped out and the training camp. On June 23, 30 planes and 6 cannons were destroyed,

100 Americans put out of action at the Go Hoi airstrip.

Binh Dinh, reported to have made big strides in pacification, was also repeatedly attacked. Its defense system was shattered by the L.A.F. telling blow, resulting in 10 million litres of petrol burnt in Qui Nhon (on the night of May 19), 1,600,000 litres of kerosene, some ammunition depots destroyed in the Bong Son U.S. logistic base (on the night of June 6).

In the Western High Plateaux, the L.A.F. Kontum and Dy'an unremittingly attacked Highways 14 and 19, putting out of action 1,000 enemy troops most of them Americans, in 9 days (June 1 to 18). U.S. bases in Pleiku, Bau Cam, Duc Co, and puppet bases in Tan Canh, Lo To Ram were also violently attacked.

Westmoreland hastened to send Paratroop Brigade 178 from Bien Hoa to North Kontum to support puppet troops and G.I.s from Division 4. One day after their arrival, reinforcements fell into a L.A.F. ambush. 3 companies were annihilated or heavily mauled (June 22). A strategic mobile force, they had no help to the G.I.'s from Division 4 which had been badly battered at Duc Co (July 12). A whole U.S. company was wiped out and another suffered heavy losses.

Taking advantage of U.S. difficulties in the Central Truong Bo, the L.A.F. in Ben Cat dealt thunder blows at the Bien

(Continued page 7)